

ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY (IRP) AN INTRODUCTION

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Central Asia, which can historically be called the 'second cradle' of Islam, has become a station of conspiracies of world powers after the disintegration of previous Soviet Union. To compete with these world powers, there are three such movements in Central Asia. Among which Islamic Renaissance Party stands first. Islamic Renaissance Party came into being in early 1990s. This Islamic movement was acclaimed a lot by the Muslims of the area due to its moderate ideology, ideological maturity and political consciousness. According to Alexei V. Malashenko, 'besides being moderate, IRP is modern political formation, supporting the idea of equality for all religious beliefs and concentrating its attention on culture; on preserving the Islamic heritage and on family relations' (1). This movement is actively working in all areas of Muslim states of Russia, whether they belong to five independent states of Central Asia or the areas of Northern Caucasus like the Tatar areas of Russian Federation and Daghestan or Moscow city.

As this Islamic movement emerged in Soviet Union in early 1990s, therefore, many religious scholars belonging to various regional countries of this area besides Tajikistan were permanent members of this movement. These members were also related to the Islamic movements of their respective areas. Atif Abdul Hamid says that the most important point is that Muslims of that area worked for Islamic revival in Central Asia leaving behind the secretarian affairs. Sufis, Qadimists and other Muslims with various ideologies were also the part of this movement. They proved their open heartedness to such an extent that they also included those Muslims of the area who were ideologically related to nationalist movement (2). This was the strategy that ideologically and politically provided a combined platform to the Muslims living in the territories of the Soviet Union to establish a new government. Islamic Renaissance Party kept on struggling to develop a combined platform for the revival of an Islamic system with the Russian Muslims of Central Asia at territorial level just before the dismemberment of Soviet Union. In 1990, it became so successful for the achievement of its goals that its branches spread to Daghestan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kirghizstan. Its centre was established at Astrakhan near the eastern border of Caucasus in Southern Russia.(3)

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- ¹¹ Hobbs, Thomas, *Leviathan*, ed., Richard Tuck, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 86.
- ¹² Locke, John, ed., T. P. Peardon, *The Second Treatise of Government*, (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952), ch. 2, sect. 4-6, pp. 4-6.
- ¹³ Locke, John, T. P. Peardon, ed., *The Second Treatise of Government*, (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952), chap. 13, sect. 149, p. 84.
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- ¹⁴ Toynbee, *The World and the West*, pp. 70-71.
- ¹⁵ Toynbee, *A Study of History*, pp. 312-13.
- ¹⁶ Anderson, B, *Imagined Communities*, (London: Verso, 1991), p. 13.
- ¹⁷ Held, D., "Democracy and the Global System," in Held, D., (ed.), *Political Theory Today*, (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), p. 210.
- ¹⁸ Held, D., "Democracy and the Global System," in Held, D., (ed.), *Political Theory Today*, (Cambridge: Polity, 1991), pp. 212-13.
- ¹⁹ Hutton, Will, "The world financial system," in *Financial Times*, 25 January 1995.
- ²⁰ Opello, C. Jr. Walter, and Stephen, J. Rosow, *The Nation-State and Global Order*, (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Ltd, 2005), p. 245.
- ²¹ O'Leary, Brendan, "On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner's Writings on Nationalism," in *British Journal of Political Science*, 27:191-222.1997, 221.
- ²² Rourke, T. John and Boyer, A. Mark, *International Politics on the World Stage*, (Bosten: McGraw-Hill Companies, 2004), p. 104.
- ²³ Iqbal, Muhammad, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thoughts in Islam*, edited and annotated by M. Saeed Sheikh, (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 6th edition, 2006), p. 169.
- ²⁴ Iqbal, Muhammad, *Bāng-e-Dirā*, (Urdu), (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1994), pp. 173-174.
- ²⁵ Maududi, Abul Ala, "Political Theory of Islam," in Khurshid Ahmed, (ed.), *Islam Its Meaning and Message*, p. 154.
- ²⁶ Qutb, Sayyed, *Al-Adalat al-Ijmaiah fi al-Islam*, (Arabic), [Social Justice in Islam], (Cairo: Al-Manar, 1994), p. 119.
- ²⁷ Al-Qaradawi, Dr. Yusuf, *Towards A Sound Awakening, Renovating Religion and Promoting Life*, trans. Dr. Abderrafi Benhallam, (Rabat: ISESCO, 1997), p. 105.
- ²⁸ See Muslim, *Al-Sahih*, chap. "Imarah," no. 57.
- ²⁹ Abu Dā'ūd, *Al-Sunan*, (Arabic), (Riaz: Dar al-Salam, 1999), chap. "Jihad," no. 147.
- ³⁰ Al-Quran 3: 110.
- ³¹ Amin, Tahir, *Nationalism and Internationalism in Liberalism, Marxism and Islam*, foreworded by Dr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari, (Islamabad: IIIT, 1991), pp. xiii-xiv.

Augsburg in 1555. Its terms provided that each of the rulers of the German states, which numbered about 300, choose between Roman Catholicism and Lutheranism and enforce the chosen faith upon the ruler's subjects. Lutheranism, by then the religion of about half the population of Germany, thus finally gained official recognition, and the ancient concept of the religious unity of a single Christian community in Western Europe under the supreme authority of the pope was destroyed.

⁵ On the importance of the Protestant revolt for the rise of the current global order of sovereign states, see Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

⁶ The peasants were defeated in 1525, but the cleavage between Roman Catholics and Lutherans increased. A degree of compromise was reached at the *Diet of Speyer* in 1526, when it was agreed that German princes wishing to practice Lutheranism should be free to do so. At a second Diet of Speyer, convened three years later, the Roman Catholic majority abrogated the agreement. The Lutheran minority protested against this action and became known as Protestants; thus the first Protestants were Lutherans, the term being extended subsequently to include all the Christian sects that developed from the revolt against Rome. The term Protestantism was given to the movement after the second Diet of Speyer (1529), an imperial assembly at which the Roman Catholic majority withdrew the tolerance granted to Lutherans at the first diet three years earlier. A protest was signed by six Lutheran princes and the leaders of 14 free cities of Germany, and Lutherans in general became known as Protestants. The term Protestant has gradually been attached to all Christian churches that are not Roman Catholic or part of the Orthodox or other Eastern Christian traditions. In the late 1990s the world had about 400 million Protestants (including some 64 million Anglicans), constituting about one-fifth of all affiliated Christians.

⁷ Marphy, Alexander, B. "The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations," in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds.), *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 86.

⁸ By 1618, however, the religious peace collapsed, resulting in a series of destructive conflicts known collectively as the Thirty Years' War. The long war ended in a draw, finalized by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. By the terms of the treaty, reminiscent of the Peace of Augsburg, each prince could determine the religion of his German state, choosing among Lutheran, Catholic, or Calvinist. More significantly, the sovereignty and independence of each of the 350-odd states of the Holy Roman Empire was now at last formally recognized, making the emperor powerless. Despite a few fiscal and diplomatic prerogatives, the Holy Roman Empire thus continued mainly in name, having lost all claims to universality or effective centralized government. In practice, it was now little more than a title passed on by the Habsburg rulers of one German state—Austria—with its future tied to the fate of the Habsburg dynasty.

⁹ Ibid., p. 91.

¹⁰ Fazlur Rahman, Dr., *Islam and Modernity*, (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 15.

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¹ The term pope was used in the Eastern Church from about 250, the bishop of Rome didn't start using the title until Pope Leo the Great (r. 440-461), and it wasn't until 1073 that the bishop of Rome asserted exclusive claim to the title.

² See for detail: Hayes, Baldwin, and Cole, *History of Western Civilization*, (London: The Macmillan Co., 1970), vol. I, pp. 53-61, Eugene G. Bewkes, Howard B. Jefferson, Herman A. Brautigam, Eugene T. Adams, and J. Calvin Keene, *The Western Heritage of Faith and Reason*, (London: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), pp. 349-360, Opello, Walter C. Jr., and Stephen J. Rosow, *The Nation-State and Global Order*, (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Ltd., 2005), pp. 28-31, Sonn, Tamara, *The State and Islam, The Challenge of Political Legitimacy in the Muslim World*, (Lahore: Pak Book Corporation, 1990), pp. 3-4, Sonn, Tamara, *Between Quran and Crown, the Challenge of Political Legitimacy in the Arab World*, Oxford: Western Press, 1990), pp. 3-4, The name of Tamara Sonn's books although different but their contents and material is totally same.

³ A convention of the estates of the German Empire convoked by Emperor Charles V and held in the town of Worms (Germany) to hear the case of Martin Luther who had already been excommunicated by the Pope. Asked to retract his writings against the papacy, Luther declared: "Unless I shall be convinced by the testimonies of the Scriptures or by clear reason....I neither can nor will make any retraction, since it is neither safe nor honorable to act against conscience." Referred to the authority of the Church, particularly to the Council of Constance with which he was at variance, Luther insisted, "The Church universal is the number of elect." According to tradition, Luther concluded his self-defence with the words, "Here I stand. I cannot do otherwise. God help me. Amen." Luther's courage won him admirers, but the Diet adopted an edict declaring him an outlaw. Edict of Worms was issued by the famous Diet of Worms, 1521, in condemnation of Luther's position. It was notable for its comprehensiveness in denouncing Luther's views, the severity of its penalties, and for its practical ineffectiveness. It also attempted to subject the press to the rigid ecclesiastical censorship. See *Encyclopedia of Religion*, edited by Vergilius Ferm, p. 830.

⁴ In 1530 the German scholar and religious reformer Melanchthon drew up a conciliatory statement of the Lutheran tenets, known as the Augsburg Confession, which was submitted to Emperor Charles V and to the Roman Catholic faction. Although it failed to reconcile the differences between Roman Catholics and Lutherans, it remained the basis of the new Lutheran church and creed. Subsequently, a series of wars with France and the Ottoman Empire prevented Charles V from turning his military forces against the Lutherans, but in 1546 the emperor was finally free of international commitments; and in alliance with the pope and with the aid of Duke Maurice of Saxony, he made war against the Schmalkaldic League, a defensive association of Protestant princes. The Roman Catholic forces were successful at first. Later, however, Duke Maurice went over to the Protestant side, and Charles V was obliged to make peace. The religious civil war ended with the religious Peace of

nothing but brothers to one another and were declared by the Prophet (peace be upon him) to be “one hand” against all others.²⁹ Unlike a tribe, or a nation in the ordinary sense of the term, the Muslim ummah has not been raised to pursue its group interest, or to seek the fulfillment of its economic and political ambitions. It is an ummah which, rather than exist for its own sake, has been raised “for all mankind.”³⁰ Moreover, they are an ummah with a mission—the mission to uphold the word of God, to be witnesses of truth and justice, to constantly endeavour to promote good and oppose evil.”³¹

Shortly, “Nation-State” is a governmental and administrative apparatus of a bounded national territory. “Sovereignty” is the idea of ultimate political authority. The widespread legitimacy of the idea of sovereign statehood has hindered the development of authoritative institutions above the nation-state. Obvious questions about the external sovereign status of nations are raised. Moreover, it now exists within a world order in which managerial states dominate; indeed, most people live in states whose lives are regulated and disciplined by powerful managerial states, and through these states the norms of the states-system, as well as the organizations of the global capitalist economy. Military, economic, and social forces are into question the state’s territoriality, as well as the modern state’s insistence on a politics of control from the center. Socio-political scientists expect nationalism to eventually cease to be an important political phenomenon. Also unclear is what would follow if state-centric nationalism were to die out. Islam is neither nationalism nor imperialism but a community (ummah).

nationalities cannot participate in this state as equals, they may do so only as slaves or subjects.”²⁵

Sayyed Qutb strongly believed in the universality of islam’s message.

He wrote:

“Islam came to evaluate man and save him from the bonds of earth and soil, the bonds of flesh and blood. There is no country for the Muslim except that where the Shariah of God is established, where human relations are bonded by their relationship to God. There is no nationality for a Muslim except his creed which makes him a member of the Islamic ummah in the abode of Islam.”²⁶

Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi says that:

“The notion of nationalism is a pre-Islamic and backward notion, which denies religion, and any religion, Islam or other, denies it. That it is pre-Islamic, is because it revives chauvinism, which is one of the special features of the pre-Islamic period, and from which Islam and its Prophet distanced themselves completely as the Prophet (peace be upon him) said: ‘There is no one from us who advocated chauvinism, there is one from us who fought for chauvinism, and there is no one from us who died for chauvinism’.”²⁷

Dr. Zafar Ishaq Ansari believes that Islam is international and its message is universal:

“To start up with, it needs to be emphasized that it is not for the first time in its history that Islam has wrestled with the problem of competing loyalties. At the very time of its inception, Islam was faced with the challenge of asabiyah, the moving spirit of the pre-Islamic social order. Asabiyah was an idea which greatly resembled nationalism since it signified boundless and unconditional loyalty to the tribe or clan. The two bear striking resemblance in so far as while asabiyah denotes supreme loyalty to the tribe, nationalism denotes supreme loyalty to the nation. Significantly enough, the motto of the sixth century Arabs was: “Help your brother [clansman]: right or wrong”. Could any thing be closer to the motto of the nationalists in the present century: “My nation: right or wrong”? Islam strongly denounced tribal asabiyah in the strongest terms. Whoever fights for or invites people to asabiyah, according to the Prophet (peace be upon him), is “not from me.”²⁸ Rather than the tribe, Islam itself became the main rallying-point, the major unifying force, the primary basis of communal cohesion. Thus, Muslims were held by the Quran to be

the people. Hence, the ummah's freedom to make its decisions is circumscribed by the set of principles laid down in the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet (peace be upon him). Justice is the key criterion for the society's socio-economic life.

Islam's world-view, in Muhammad Iqbal's opinion, is based on two basic assumptions: 1. the principle of Tawhid—that God is one, and 2. that man is God's representative on the earth and a special trustee.

"Islam is non-territorial in its character, and its aim is to furnish a model for, the final combination of humanity by drawing its adherents from a variety of mutually repellent races, and then transforming this atomic aggregate into a people possessing self-consciousness of their own."23

Iqbal emphasized to the Muslims that ethnic, racial, and territorial differences have limited utility and are recognized in Islam for purposes identification only. Islam is neither nationalism nor imperialism but a community (ummah). Iqbal's verdict against nationalism is forcefully expressed in the following verses:

"Of these new deities, the biggest is the fatherland—the deity whose garment is the coffin of religion. The rivalry of nations is due to this. The subjugation of nations through commerce is due to this. If politics is devoid of honesty, it is because of this; if the home of the weak is ruined, it is because of this. It is this divides the creatures of God into nations; it is this which strikes at the root of the nationality of Islam."24

In Maududi's view, nationalism is inconsistent with Islam, because it divides man from man on the basis of nationality. Nationalism simply means that the nationalist should give preference to his nationality over all other nationalities. Even if a man is not an aggressive nationalist, nationalism at least demands that culturally, politically, economically and legally he should differentiate between one who belongs to one's nation and the others to ensure maximum advantages for his nation; to preserve with tenacity the historical traditions and traditional prejudices and to generate the sentiments of national pride:

"He [nationalist] would not admit with him members of other nationalities in any walk of life on an equal basis. Whenever there is a chance of obtaining more advantages, as against each other, his heart would be sealed against all sentiments of justice. His ultimate goal would be nation-state rather than a world state; nevertheless if he upholds any world ideology, that ideology would necessarily take the form of imperialism or world domination, because members of other

in warfare; 2. the globalization of capitalism; 3. the fracturing of national identity; 4. the emergence of 'hypermedia' networks."20

The decline in sovereignty of the nation-states which has taken three forms:
An increase in the political power of globalizing capital within the nation-state.
The emergence of super state political authorities and regional authoritative institutions in the European Union.
An expansion in the mandate and scope of operation of multicultural agencies such as the Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization.

Capital has now outgrown the nation state. It needs a state, which de-legitimizes citizen's national sovereignty. The focus on human rights, toleration and pluralism is a means for achieving this de-legitimation of the citizen's national sovereignty through a weakening of the nation state.

Nationalism: Will the Curtain Fall?

A critical question in the future of nationalism, and indeed the course of world politics, is whether nationalism will significantly weaken or even die out. The answer is unclear. The existence of divergent identities based on language and other cultural differences extends as far back into time as we can see.

It must be said that group identification and nationalism are not synonymous. The sense of sovereignty attached to cultural identification is relatively modern. "Nationalism and nations have not been permanent features of human history," as one scholar puts it.²¹ Therefore, nationalism, having not always existed, will not necessarily always be the world's principal form of political orientation. Rourke and Boyer say:

"Socio-political scientists expect nationalism to eventually cease to be an important political phenomenon. Also unclear is what would follow if state-centric nationalism were to die out. Some scholars believe that it will be replaced by culture, religion, or some other demographic characteristic as the primary sense of political self."²²

Nationalism and Islamic Identity:

Islam considers believers to belong to one global community, the ummah. The distinctions of race, language and colour, according to Islamic view, are accidental and for facility of reference only. It recognizes shura (mutual consultation) in the community as the hall-mark of its political system but sovereignty belongs to God rather than to the king, or the dictator, or even

flows of goods and services, advances in communications and information technology and the growth of global financial exchange, serious doubts have been raised about the ability of governments to maintain control over the economic determinants of their countries' well-being. These dilemmas are expressed well by the Will Hutton:

"The world financial system is spinning out of control. The stock of cross-border lending now exceeds a quarter of the GDP [Gross Domestic Product] of all industrialized countries. International Bank assets are double the value of world trade. The volume of business in the currency futures markets exceeds even that generated by daily trade flows....Not even the US, German or Japanese governments have the financial clout to deal with the new volume of speculative flows—while many developing countries lack enough reserves to cover the purchase of eight weeks' imports."19

In addition there exist a range of global institutions which appear to promote a particular international economic orthodoxy and therefore allegedly force governments to pursue particular patterns of policy. The operation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank provide a good example.

Walter C. Opello, Jr. and Stephen J. Rosow write the future of sovereignty:

"The modern territorial state is a unique historical creation of relatively recent vintage. It is not eternal, and no form of it is universal. Moreover, it now exists within a world order in which managerial states dominate; indeed, most people live in states whose lives are regulated and disciplined by powerful managerial states, and through these states the norms of the states-system, as well as the organizations of the global capitalist economy. Military, economic, and social forces are into question the state's territoriality, as well as the modern state's insistence on a politics of control from the center. The ability to represent the state as territorially sovereign is diminished by changes in warfare, the globalization of capitalism, the proliferation of international managerial institutions, and the tremendous mobility of people around the globe. Present developments not only seem to be challenging the current form of the state, but are also questioning the possibilities of territorialized, sovereign politico-military power. This is not to argue that the nation-state is disappearing, but that state sovereignty is facing serious challenges. Territorial states have always had to confront forces that overflow the representation of a sharp claimed to be 'in control' and in which the subject population was pacified—and sovereignty outside, that is, the state's independence in a system of juridically sovereign states in a world of perpetual violence and war. These forces are, at a minimum, intensifying in the global order. Now we examine four forces that recently have challenged nation-state sovereignty: 1. Changes

legitimacy of the idea of sovereign statehood has hindered the development of authoritative institutions above the nation-state.

Sovereignty is one of the most written about political concepts. It is the subject of both philosophical discussion and political jousting. Sovereignty is in essence about the power to make laws and the ability to rule effectively. The concept throws up the obvious connotation of rule by a monarch (a sovereign) who would be, as D. Held puts it, “invested with an authority which confers the force of the law upon whatever he wills.”¹⁷ This perspective of the all-powerful sovereign was given its most powerful theoretical justification by the English philosopher Thomas Hobbs in the seventeenth century. Hobbs’s sovereign need not be a single person; what he is really advocating in *Leviathan* is that the state be invested with absolute power. Hobbs reason that left to a situation of individual self government, people would engage in the relentless pursuit of their own interests. This would lead to a perpetual power struggle, a “warre of every one against every one” as Hobbs puts it.

In recent years the idea that nation-states are able to be sovereign has been the subject of serious challenge. For increasing numbers of analysts, the study of a nation’s politics in isolation from the broader global environment has become impossible. This is based on observations such as the view that a country’s politics may be affected by political events in other nations. Obvious questions about the external sovereign status of nations are raised. A further observation is that forms of authority above the nation-state have come into being and, as we just noted, politics takes place in various forms above the nation-state. Again, the external dimension of sovereignty appears to be threatened by forces apparently beyond the control of national governments. One of the principal political theorists of this transformation is David Held. He points out that:

“There are disjunctures between the idea of the state as in principle capable of determining its own future, and the world economy, international law and military alliances which operate to shape and constrain the options of individual nation-states.”¹⁸

Much of this bound up with the processes of globalization which we have discussed above. Here we need to identify the kinds of things which threaten the external sovereignty of nation-states and which might also help our understanding of the creation of international and potentially supranational bodies which exercise authority above the nation-state.

The most obvious of these factors is the operation of the world economy. With the increases in multinational production, the rise in the global